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BLASTING THE CAP: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
ARISING FROM MARYLAND'S LIMITATION OF
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES IN PERSONAL
INJURY CLAIMS
A topic offervent debate in recent years has been the growing crisis in
personal injury liability insurance, particularly in the area of medical malpractice. Insurers, doctors, and lawyers have presented differing theories
as to the cause and solution of the problem. In 1986, the Maryland General Assembly sought to resolve the crisis by limiting the amount recoverable for noneconomic damages in a personal injury action to $350,000.
Similar provisions in other states have been struck down as unconstitutional. This comment examines the constitutionality of Maryland's
noneconomic damages limitation and argues that the damage limitation
violates both the state and federal constitutions. The author concludes
with a discussion of the feasibility and potential effectiveness of alternative
legislation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 27, 1986, the Maryland General Assembly enacted Senate
Bill No. 558 into law, codified at sections 10-913, 11-108 and 11-109 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code. 1 The
key provision of the enactment limits a plaintiff's recovery of
noneconomic damages in a personal injury suit to $350,000. 2
Noneconomic damages include pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other nonpecuniary
injury. 3 The legislation also requires that juries in personal injury actions
itemize the damage award, allows for periodic payment of future economic damages, and provides for unpaid future medical expenses to re1. A provision allowing the defendant to introduce evidence of payments made to the
plaintiff by collateral sources was stricken from the legislation prior to enactment.
See 1986 Md. Laws 639. But see infra note 18 (discussing new Maryland legislation
allowing defendant to move for remittitur or new trial on the ground that the award
is excessive as a result of payments received by the claimant from collateral
sources).
2. Section 11-108 provides:
(a) Noneconomic damages - In this section:
(1) "Noneconomic damages" means pain, suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other nonpecuniary injury and
(2) "Noneconomic damages" does not include punitive damages.
(b) Limitation of $350,000 established.- In any action for damages for
personal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after July 1, 1986,
an award for noneconomic damages may not exceed $350,000.
(c) Award under§ 3-2A-06 included.- An award by the health claims
arbitration panel in accordance with § 3-2A-06 of this article shall be considered an award for purposes of this section. (1986, ch. 639).
MD. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108.
3. /d.

328

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 16

vert to the defendant upon the plaintiff's death. 4
The noneconomic damages cap and its concomitant legislation was
enacted in response to what the legislature perceives to be a growing liability insurance crisis in Maryland. 5 Although the legislation applies to
all personal injury actions, its primary goal is to provide relief to health
care providers and their insurers. 6 Specifically, three bases have been articulated for the enactment of the legislation: (1) the desire to attract
private insurers back to the Maryland market; (2) the need for qualified
physicians providing a full compliment of medical services in Maryland;
and (3) the necessity of providing affordable liability insurance to health
care providers. 7
Although there is evidence to the contrary, 8 it does appear that a
4. Section 11-109 provides in part:

***

(b) Itemized award.- As part of the verdict in any action for damages for personal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after July
1, 1986, the trier of fact shall itemize the award to reflect the monetary
amount intended for:
(1) Past medical expenses;
(2) Future medical expenses;
(3) Past loss of earnings;
(4) Future loss of earnings;
(5) Noneconomic damages; and
(6) Other damages.
(c) Form of award for future economic damages, appointment of
conservator. - (1) The court or the health claims arbitration panel may
order that all or part of the future economic damages portion of the award
be paid in the form of annuities or other appropriate financial instruments,
or that it be paid in periodic or other payments consistent with the needs
of the plaintiff, funded in full by the defendant or the defendant's insurer
and equal when paid to the amount of the future economic damages
award.

***

5.
6.
7.
8.

(d) Death of plaintiff before final payment of award. - If the plaintiff
under this section dies before the final periodic payment of an award is
made, the unpaid balance of the award for future loss of earnings shall
revert to the estate of the plaintiff and the unpaid balance of the award for
future medical expenses shall revert to the defendant or to the defendant's
insurer if the insurer provided the funds for the future damages award.
Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108.
Sia, Tort Reform Clamor Anticipated, Baltimore Evening Sun, Dec. 28, 1986, at Dl,
col. 5; Angoff and Hunter, How Far Have We Come in Solving the 'Liability Crisis'?,
Baltimore Evening Sun, Feb. 3, 1987, at A10, col. 1, 2.
See 1986 Md. Laws 639 (The original draft of the bill would have made the
noneconomic damages cap applicable only to actions involving health care
providers.).
See Classen, Liability Crisis Easing for Doctors?, Daily Record, Jan. 2, 1987, at 10,
col. 3.
One survey indicates that health care providers allocated a lower percentage of net
income to liability insurance costs in 1983 than they did seven years earlier. Law, A
Consumer Perspective on Medical Malpractice, 49 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 305,
308 (No.2, 1986)(decrease from 4.40% to 3.69%) [hereinafter A Consumer Perspective]. In 1986, the insurance industry posted $11.5 billion dollars in profits, a record
high and a six-hundred percent increase over 1985. McNatt, New Solutions Needed
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serious liability insurance problem exists in Maryland. 9 Identification of
the cause of the problem has stirred debate among insurance representatives, health care providers, and lawyers. 10 An unbiased and informed
observer would conclude that a variety of complex factors have contributed to exacerbate the problem.
This comment will examine the constitutional problems posed by
Maryland's damage limitation and will discuss the likely resolution of
those constitutional issues. 11 In so doing, the comment will analyze
closely the relationship between the causes of the liability insurance crisis
and the legislation created to resolve it. The comment will conclude with
a discussion of the feasibility and potential effectiveness of alternative
legislation.
II.

COMPARISON OF MARYLAND'S CAP TO OTHER
STATES' CAPS

A review of legislation limiting personal injury awards reveals a variety of approaches. Although Maryland's noneconomic damages cap is
similar in many respects to other states' personal injury recovery caps
(PIRCs), several vital differences exist which may cause a constitutional
analysis of the Maryland cap to result in a different conclusion than an
analysis of analogous provisions in other states. Of the states that have
enacted caps on personal injury recovery, including those states that have
for Maryland's Insurance 'Crisis', Baltimore Evening Sun, Jan. 13, 19S7, at AS, col.
I. A recent trend is discernible that insurance premium rates are stabilizing and
liability insurance is generally easier to obtain than it was a year or two ago. See
Gattuso, How Far Have We Come in Solving the Liability Crisis?, Baltimore Evening
Sun, Feb. 3, 19S7, at AlO, col. 1, 2.
9. Malpractice insurance premiums have risen by 217 percent in the last two years.
Sia, Tort Reform Clamor Anticipated, Baltimore Evening Sun, Dec. 2S, 19S6, at D2,
col. 2. The number of physicians providing professional services to pregnant women in Maryland has fallen from 525 physicians to about 300 physicians. Id. Municipalities in the state have experienced increasing difficulty in obtaining liability
insurance. Id. See also Walker, Panel Cool on Awards Limit, Baltimore Evening
Sun, Feb. 1S, 19S7, at B1, col. 5.
10. See Sia, Tort Reform Clamor Anticipated, at AS, col. I. (Dennis McCoy, the trial
lawyers' lobbyist, advocates stronger regulation of the insurance industry); McNatt,
New Solutions Needed for Maryland's Insurance 'Crisis', Baltimore Evening Sun,
Jan. 13, 19S7, at AS, col. I (Stronger regulation of the insurance industry is
needed.). See also Jensen, Legislative Larceny: The Leg1:slature Acts Unconstitutionally When It Arbitrarily Abolishes or Limits Common Law Rights To Redress For
Injury, 31 S.D.L. REV. 82, n.3 (19S5) (citing a study which concludes that the medical malpractice crisis is a result of a lax disciplinary system which seldom sanctions
negligent physicians) [hereinafter Legislative Larceny]. See generally Redlich, Ending the Never-Ending Medical Malpractice Crisis, 3S ME. L. REV. 2S3 (19S6) (discussing the friction generated between the three professions on the issue of the
causes of the medical malpractice crisis) [hereinafter Redlich].
II. The comment will not address the separate issues of limitations applicable to governmental tort liability or federal government powers to limit recovery in tort. Section 11-lOS is a result of state governmental action which covers all tortfeasors. The
19S7 General Assembly has passed a statute which limits governmental tort liability
to $250,000.
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subsequently found the cap to be unconstitutional or failed to reenact a
temporary cap, one places a limit on punitive damages, 12 twelve, including Maryland, limit noneconomic damages only, 13 ten limit the plaintiff's
total recovery, 14 and two limit the plaintiff's total recovery excepting
medical expenses. 15
Nearly every state PIRC applies specifically to medical malpractice
actions. 16 Maryland's cap, however, encompasses all personal injury actions with the exception of personal injury actions against state and local
governments. 17 Moreover, unlike Maryland, some states enacted their
12. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-3402(d) (Supp. 1985) (limiting punitive damages to a certain
percentage of the tortfeasor's gross earnings but in no event greater than
$3,000,000).
13. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1987) ($250,000 limitation); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.80 (West Supp. 1987) ($450,000 limitation); Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 11-108 (Supp. 1986) ($350,000 limitation); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.1483 (West's Mich. Legis. Service, No. 4 1986) ($225,000 limitation); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1983) ($250,000 limitation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.43 (Page 1981) ($200,000 limitation); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-14-7.1 (Supp.
1986) ($250,000 limitation); W.VA. CODE§ 55-7B-8 (1986 Supp.) ($1,000,000 limitation); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 893.55(4)(d) (West Supp. 1985) ($1,000,000 limitation).
Massachusetts has enacted a discretionary limitation on noneconomic damages. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West Supp. 1987) ($500,000 limitation).
The jury, or the court in a nonjury trial, may ignore the limitation where "a substantial or permanent loss or impairment of a bodily function or substantial disfigurement, or other special circumstances" are present. /d.
14. Former ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70 § 101 (1975) ($500,000 limitation); IND. CODE
ANN.§ 16-9.5-2-2 (Burn's 1983) ($500,000 limitation); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-3407
(Supp. 1986) ($1,000,000 limitation and a $250,000 limitation on noneconomic
damages; court may award additional damages for medical expenses up to
$3,000,000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (1986 Rep!.) ($500,000 limitation); N.D.
CENT. CODE§ 26.1-14-11 (Supp. 1985) ($500,000 limitation); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-2825 (1984) ($1,000,000 limitation); R.I. GEN. LAW§ 9-31-3 (1985) ($100,000
limitation on governmental liability, but the limitation does not apply if the injury
occurs while the state is engaged in a proprietary function); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws
ANN. § 21-3-11 (Supp. 1986) ($1,000,000 limitation); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8307(e) (1986) (limits governmental liability to $300,000 per person and $1,000,000
per occurrence); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.18 (1983) ($1,000,000 limitation).
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 40-1299.42 (1984 and West Supp. 1987) ($500,000 limitation); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § ll.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987) ($500,000 limitation; but Texas has a fall-back provision which limits noneconomic damage
recovery to $150,000 if the current statute is found unconstitutional. See art. 4590i,
§ 11.03.).
16. But see R.I. GEN. LAW§ 9-31-3; TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(e).
17. See supra note 2. A separate $250,000 recovery limitation on tort actions against
"local governments" was enacted in 1987 by the Maryland General Assembly. See
1987 Md. Laws 594. "Local government" is defined as:
(D) "Local government" means:
(I) a chartered county established under article 25A of the code;
(2) a code county established under article 25B of the code;
(3) a board of county commissioners established or operating under
article 25 of the code;
(4) Baltimore City;
(5) a municipal corporation established or operating under article
23A of the code;
(6) the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission;
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PIRCs as part of a comprehensive legislative scheme at least partially
designed to ensure the availability of funds to compensate a victorious
personal injury plaintitf. 18 In these states, health care providers must
register with the state and contribute to a state sponsored insurance fund
to receive the protection of the cap. 19 These states combine a limitation
on a qualified health care provider's liability with a guarantee of an insurance fund pool to cover payment of any award above this limitation, but
only to the extent allowable under the PIRC. 20 Application of Maryland's PIRC is not tied to any potential tortfeasor's compliance with or
contribution to a comprehensive compensation scheme.

(7) the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission;
(8) a community college or board of trustees for a community college established or operating under Title 16 of the education article;
(9) a county public library or board of trustees of a county public
library established or operating under Title 23, or Title 3 of the education
article;
(10) the Enoch Pratt Free Library or Board of Trustees of the
Enoch Pratt Free Library;
(11) the Washington County Free Library or the Board of Trustees
of the Washington County Free Library;
(12) a special taxing district; and
(13) a nonprofit community service corporation incorporated under
Maryland law that is authorized to collect charges or assessments.
/d.
18. See, e.g., IND. ConE ANN. § 16-9.5 (Burns 1983 and Supp. 1986) (Medical Malpractice Act); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41 (1984) (West 1977 and Supp.
1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.40.66 (West 1986 and Supp. 1987).
Maryland does have a state created voluntary insurance fund, but application
of section 11-108 bears no relationship to whether the tortfeasor is covered by the
insurance fund. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 548-56 (1986). In Maryland,
additional legislation has been enacted during the past legislative session, but this
legislation further inhibits a personal injury plaintiff's ability to sue for and recover
damages from a tortfeasor. See Sia, Tort Reform Clamor Anticipated, Baltimore
Evening Sun, Dec. 28, 1986, at Dl, col. 5. In an action predicated on medical
malpractice, the defendant may move for remitittur or new trial on the ground that
the award is excessive due to payments received by the claimant from collateral
sources. See 1987 Md. Laws 596. Unless actual malice is proven, the liability of
local governments and their employees is limited to $200,000 per individual claim
and $500,000 per occurrence. See 1987 Md. Laws 594. The age that an underage
claimant's cause of action against a health claim provider begins to accrue for limitations purposes is reduced from 16 years of age to 11 years of age. See 1987 Md.
Laws 592.
19. See IND. CODE ANN.§ 16-9.5-1-5 (Burns 1983) (The Act's provisions, including the
damages limitation, only apply to health care providers who contribute to the patient's compensation fund.); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.410 (West Supp.
1987) (same).
20. IND. CODE ANN.§ 16-9.5-1-5; LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 40:1299.410. A substantive due process attack on a state PIRC may be weakened by the establishment of a
patient's compensation fund because a quid pro quo is established. See infra notes
141-42 and accompanying text.
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CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ON PERSONAL INJURY
RECOVERY CAPS

This section reviews the various constitutional attacks that have
been presented in challenging statutory limitations on recovery for personal injury. It is important to recognize at the outset that state constitutions often provide more stringent protection of individual rights than
does the federal constitution. Accordingly, no constitutional analysis of
a state PIRC is complete without reference to the relevant state constitution and the interpretation of that document by the state's highest
court. 21

A.

Right to a Jury Trial

Perhaps the most compelling argument proffered in striking down
state PIRCs as unconstitutional is one based on constitutional right to
jury trial provisions. 22 Recently, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, exercising its diversity jurisdiction, found
that Virginia's $1,000,000 total damages recovery limitation violated
both the federal and state constitutional right to jury trial provisions. 23
The court held that the legislature may not preempt a jury's finding of
fact once a matter has properly been submitted to and decided by that
jury. 24 In so holding, the court differentiated between procedural regulations and substantive limitations on the jury function:
The legislature may pass measures which affect the way a jury
determines factual issues. The legislature may prescribe rules
of procedure and evidence, create legal presumptions, allocate
burdens of proof, and the like. Just as certainly, the legislature
may abolish a common law right of action and if it desires, replace it with a compensation scheme. The legislature may even
make rules concerning the type of damages recoverable and the
way in which damages are paid. But the legislature may not
preempt a jury's findings on a factual issue which has properly
21. See infra, notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
22. By striking down state PIRC's as violative of state constitutional right to jury trial
provisions, state courts can avoid engaging in a stringent constitutional equal protection analysis, an analysis that may be subject to criticism as judicial legislation.
Cf Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 158, 695 P.2d 665, 679, 211
Cal. Rptr. 368, 382 (1985) ("[P]olicy determinations as to the need for, and the
desirability of, the enactment are for the legislature."); Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 387, 404 N.E.2d 585, 594 (1980) ("In dealing with the constitutionality of a statute of our State, we do not sit to judge the wisdom or rightness of
its underlying policies.").
23. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986). Prior to determining the constitutionality of the Virginia PIRC under state and federal constitutional right to jury
trial provisions, the court found that the PIRC did not violate state or federal equal
protection provisions. Jd. at 787-88. Cf Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d
1080, 1088-89 (Fla. 1987) (providing, in dicta, that Florida's PIRC unconstitutionally infringes on the constitutional right to a jury trial).
24. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 789-90.
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been submitted to the jury. In particular, the legislature may
not mandate the amount of judgment to be entered in a trial. 25
Reaching a contrary holding, the Supreme Court of Indiana previously had upheld that state's PIRC in the face of a constitutional right to
jury trial attack. 26 The court held that Indiana's $500,000 cap on the
total recovery of damages did not interfere with the jury's assessment of
damages, but only apportioned the damages on permissible grounds of
public policy.27 This reasoning, however, fails to recognize that the constitutional right to a jury trial applies not only to factual determinations
by the jury, but also to the implementation of the jury's determination. 28
The problem with the court's upholding of the statute on those grounds
is that any determination of damages by the jury above the $500,000
PIRC set by the Indiana legislature is rendered nugatory by the fact that
the trial court is powerless to enforce the judgment to the extent in which
it exceeds the cap.
Similarly, when the Maryland noneconomic damages cap is applied,
a jury's determination of noneconomic damages in excess of $350,000
will be wholly avoided. 29 Significant legislative interference with a person's constitutional right to a jury trial warrants a court's application of
strict scrutiny. 30 Application of section 11-108 ventures far beyond the
bounds of procedural regulation of the universally recognized function of
the jury. 31 The mandatory cap on noneconomic damages simply cannot
25. /d. The Court of Appeals of Maryland also has considered the distinction between
rules of procedure and infringement upon the substantive right to have a jury determine damages in personal injury cases. In Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md.
274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978), the court held that mandatory submission of a medical
malpractice claim to an arbitration board and the subsequent use of the arbitration
board's award as presumptive evidence of actual damages in a jury trial on appeal
are procedures that do not violate Article 23. /d. at 274, 385 A.2d at 57. These
procedures were held to be reasonable restrictions that do not unconstitutionally
infringe on a person's right to a jury trial. /d. at 295-96, 385 A.2d at 69-70. The
court found it significant that, on appeal, a person would receive a trial of all factual
issues, including a determination of damages, by an unburdened jury within a reasonable time and without undue expense. /d. at 301, 385 A.2d at 72-73. The court
made a determination that the due process required by Art. 19 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights was not violated: "[W]e simply cannot conclude that the additional
expense and delay mandated by this malpractice claims statute is so unreasonable in
relation to its legitimate goal that it contravenes due process." /d. at 299, 385 A.2d
at 71. The court applied minimal scrutiny to the statute because it did not "significantly interfere" with the fundamental right to a jury trial. /d. at 310, 385 A.2d at
38.
26. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 400, 404 N.E.2d 585, 602 (1980).
27. /d.
28. "It is the policy of this Act that recoveries be limited to $500,000, and to this extent,
the right to have the jury assess the damages is available. No more is required .... "
/d. (emphasis added).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
30. Attorney General v. Johnson, 283 Md. at 310, 385 A.2d at 78. A statute subject to
strict scrutiny is nearly always struck down as unconstitutional. Attorney General
v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 707-08, 426 A.2d 929, 942 (1981).
31. Cf Knickerbocker Life Ins. v. Hoeske, 32 Md. 317, 326 (1869) (A statute which
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survive any real analysis within the parameters of Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 32

B.

Equal Protection

The most vociferous constitutional attack on state PIRCs has been
made within the ambit of federal and state equal protection provisions.
In states with PIRCs that only apply to medical malpractice actions,
PIRC legislation may violate state and federal constitutional equal protection clauses in two respects. First, the PIRC discriminates between
health care providers and all other tortfeasors, granting the benefit of the
cap only to health care providers. 33 Secondly, the PIRC discriminates
between catastrophically injured plaintiffs and less severely injured plaintiffs, allowing full recovery only to the less severely injured. 34 This second classification applies with equal force in states which apply their
PIRCs to all personal injury actions, not just to medical malpractice
claims.
Once a discriminatory classification has been established, a court
must decide which standard of equal protection analysis to utilize in examining the constitutionality of the PIRC. Traditional equal protection
analysis required that a two-tiered test be used. 35 Where the discriminatory classification infringes on a "suspect class" 36 or a "fundamental
right" 37 , the governmental action is subject to strict scrutiny. 38 The gov-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

mandates that a trial judge assess damages where the defendant loses a judgment by
default is unconstitutional because the defendant has a state constitutional right to
have a jury determine damages.) (cited in Houston v. Lloyd's Consumer Acceptance
Corp., 241 Md. 10, 15-16, 215 A.2d 192, 196 (1965)).
See Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986) (invalidating Virginia's PIRC
as violative of Virginia's right to jury trial provision).
Comment, Legislative Limitations on Medical Malpractice Damages: The Chances
of Survival, 37 MERCER L. REv. 1583, 1590-91 (1986) [hereinafter Medical Malpractice Damages].
/d.
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
For Supreme Court cases elucidating suspect classifications, see Smith, Battling a
Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38
OKLA. L. REV. 195, 202 n. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Smith].
/d. n.30. The Supreme Court has determined that the right of privacy is a fundamental right within the penumbra of several fundamental constitutional guarantees.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Although it appears that no commentator has endorsed or even discussed the creation of a fundamental right to full
recovery in tort for one's personal injuries using a Griswold approach, the idea possesses some merit. A synthesis of a right to a jury trial, a right of access to courts
including a right to "full remedy," a right to be secure in one's person, and, finally,
an equal protection right to be free of unreasonably discriminatory classifications
could lead a court to conclude that a fundamental right to full recovery in tort for
personal injuries is implicit in the federal and/or state constitutions. Cf Griswold at
484-85 (A synthesis of first amendment protection from governmental intrusions.
third amendment prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in
time of peace, fourth amendment rights to be secure in one's person, fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination, and the ninth amendment preservation of
rights not enumerated creates a fundamental right to privacy.).
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ernment must show that a compelling governmental interest is being furthered and that the least restrictive alternative available is employed in
implementing this interest. 39 Statutes rarely survive a strict scrutiny
analysis. 40
If a statute does not discriminate against a suspect class or infringe
upon a fundamental right, the statute is subject to minimal scrutiny. 41
At this level of analysis, an attack on the constitutionality of the statute
will be successful only if the plaintiff proves that the statute "rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." 42
This level of scrutiny is applied against statutes which amount to mere
economic regulation. 43 Because of the minimal standard of review, these
statutes are rarely struck down. 44
Growing dissatisfaction with this traditional two-tiered approach in
equal protection analysis has led to the development of an intermediate
analysis in cases that do not fit so neatly within the two-tier dichotomy. 45
This approach, referred to as "intermediate scrutiny" or "heightened review,"46 is applied where either quasi-suspect classes or important, but
not fundamental, substantive rights are involved. 47 The test requires that
a legislative classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation, so that persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 48 The Supreme Court has applied this
level of analysis in cases involving classifications based on gender, 49 marital status, 50 illegitimacy, 51 and alienage. 52
Many state courts have examined the equal protection implications
38. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
39. /d.; Medical Malpractice Damages, supra note 33, at 1591-92.
40. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216,219 n.6 (1984). This level of scrutiny is" 'strict' in
theory and 'fatal' in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter Gunther].
41. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425.
42. /d. (upholding Maryland's Sunday Blue Laws).
43. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981); City of
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
44. Medical Malpractice Damages, supra note 33, at 1592 ("[C]onstitutionality is all but
a foregone conclusion."); Gunther, supra note 40, at 8 ("minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact").
45. See generally Gunther, supra note 40.
46. The "heightened review" standard was developed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. See, e.g., Broadwater v. State, 306 Md. 597, 510 A.2d 583 (1986); Hornbeck v.
Somerset Co. Bd. ofEduc., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983); Attorney General v.
Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981). The "heightened review" standard
arises from the "rational basis" tier of analysis set forth by the Supreme Court. See
Waldron, 289 Md. at 709-10, 426 A.2d at 943-44.
47. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 711, 458 A.2d at 781-82.
48. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
49. Reed, 404 U.S. 71; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
50. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
51. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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of their state PIRCs. 53 No clear consensus has emerged. It is clear, however, that the level of scrutiny that a court applies will, in all likelihood,
determine whether the statute survives a constitutional attack based on
equal protection grounds. 54 Courts that apply minimal scrutiny invariably uphold the constitutionality of the PIRC. 55 Those courts that apply
an intermediate or heightened level of scrutiny invalidate the constitutionality of the statute. 5 6 Most courts have dismissed the argument that
strict scrutiny applies to PIRCs, reasoning that full recovery of damages
in tort is not a fundamental right. 57

52. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88
(1976).
53. State PIRCs have been challenged on equal protection grounds in courts in California, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985); Idaho, Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 99 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); Illinois, Wright v. Central Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Indiana, Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Louisiana, Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149, modified on rehearing, 477 So. 2d 1094 (1985); Montana, Pfost
v. State, 713 P.2d 495 (1985), White v. State, 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983)
(Both Montana cases involve caps limiting governmental tort liability.); Nebraska,
Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); New Hampshire, Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); North Dakota, Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (1978); Ohio, (Six lower state appellate courts have ruled
on the constitutionality of Ohio's PIRC.); Texas, Baptist Hosp. of S.E. Texas v.
Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); and Virginia, Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F.
Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986).
54. Medical Malpractice Damages, supra note 33 at 1594. A recent commentary was
sharply critical of the Fein decision and the apparent abandonment of the development of an intermediate tier by the Supreme Court of California; the comment lambasted the court's application of minimal scrutiny to the California PIRC. See
Comment, Medical Malpractice - $250,000 Cap On Pain & Suffering: Does the
Statute Meet Its Constitutional Burden and Legislative Goals? - Cal. Civ. Code
§ 3333.2 (1986), 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 601 (1986).
55. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 164, 695 P.2d at 683-84, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387; Prendergast,
199 Neb. at 113-14, 256 N.W.2d at 668; Johnson, 273 Ind. at 399-400,404 N.E.2d at
601. At times, the Indiana court appears to unintentionally blend an intermediate
level of scrutiny with an "any rational basis" level of scrutiny. Id. at 395-96, 404
N.E.2d at 600. First, the court appears to require a "fair and substantial" relationship between the classification and its purpose, then it requires the appellant to show
"no correlation" between the PIRC and its purpose. Id.
56. Jones, 99 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (remanding the case to the trial court which
subsequently ruled that the statute was unconstitutional); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at
135 ("whether there is a sufficiently close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals ... "); Carson, 120 N.H. at 943, 424 A.2d at 838.
57. See Carson, 120 N.H. at 931, 424 A.2d at 830; Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 155-56. Two
states have constitutional provisions which bar the legislature from enacting any
legislation which impairs a person's right to recover in full for personal injuries.
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 31, KY. CONST. § 54. Presumably, a state PIRC enacted in
either of these states would be examined under a strict scrutiny analysis. Accord
Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp .. 143 Ariz. 101, 692 P.2d 280 (1984) (cause of
action to recover damages for negligence is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Arizona Constitution.).
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Federal Equal Protection Analysis

Because of the precedent arguably established in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, 58 and the general hesitation by the
Supreme Court to expand the classifications it will subject to intermediate scrutiny, it appears that a court interpreting only the federal constitution would apply no more than minimal scrutiny when examining a
PIRC. 59 In Duke Power, the Supreme Court applied the "any rational
basis" test in upholding a federal statute limiting the recovery of damages
from a nuclear power plant operator in the event of a nuclear accident. 60
State courts that have upheld PIRCs under an "any rational basis" analysis have placed great reliance on Duke Power in declining to adopt a
more rigorous analysis. 61
Duke Power is distinguishable from the PIRC cases in several respects, however. First, while it is true that in Duke Power the Supreme
Court, in dicta, upheld the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act as
nonviolative of the equal protection implicit in the' fifth amendment, 62
the general statutory scheme implemented oy Congress to regulate the
nuclear power industry provided the statute's "general rationality." 63
No such general statutory scheme provides comparable rationality for
most state PIRCs, including the Maryland PIRC. 64 Second, the protections, purposes, and governmental interests involved in Duke Power are
strikingly different from those present where a state PIRC is involved.
The statute examined in Duke Power limits the recovery of damages in
what the Court perceived to be the extremely remote event of a major
nuclear accident, the ramifications of which would be so devastating that
a private nuclear power plant operator would almost assuredly be driven
58. 438 u.s. 59 (1978).
59. See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414 (Sth Cir. 1986) (upholding Texas'
PIRC under federal equal protection analysis); Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d
1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding California's PIRC after the Fein decision); Boyd,
647 F. Supp. 781 (appling minimal scrutiny in analyzing the equal protection implications of Virginia's PIRC). See also Smith, supra note 36, at 219 (citing Duke
Power as "strong precedent for the constitutionality of federal liability limitations").
60. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93-94 (examining 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210 (1970 ed. and Supp.
V), the Price-Anderson Act).
61. See Johnson, 273 Ind. at 395-96, 404 N.E.2d at 600 ("We conclude that the same
test [as that used by the Supreme Court in Duke] is applicable here, and that it is
likewise applicable to testing the Act on the state constitutional grounds used.");
Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d at I 56-57 ("On the basis of the above
authority [Duke Power, Fein, and Johnson], we conclude that the Act need only be
subjected to a rational basis analysis."), modified on rehearing, 477 So. 2d 1094
(1985).
62. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93-94.
63. !d.
64. A state such as Florida is in the best position to rely on the Duke Power analysis.
Florida's medical malpractice regulatory scheme provides for remittitur and additur, collateral sources, alternative methods of paying damages, court mandated
arbitration and settlement conferences, a patient's compensation fund, and a comprehensive impact study. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.40-.81 (West 1985 and
Supp. 1987). But see infra notes I S0-52 and accompanying text.
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to insolvency well before liability payments reached the cap set forth in
the Price-Anderson Act. 65 Thus, unlike state PIRCs, Price-Anderson affords a personal injury claimant a greater likelihood of recovery than he
would have had without it. 66 Further, blind reliance on federal constitutional interpretation such as that in Duke Power leads state courts to
ignore the independent vitality of their state constitutions, which may be
more protective of individual rights, 67 as well as the legitimate role state
courts play in shaping state law. 68
2.
a.

State Equal Protection Analysis
Strict Scrutiny
The right to recover in full for personal injuries is probably not a

65. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 91, n.36. The legislation in Duke Power was enacted primarily because private insurers could not adequately insure nuclear power plant
operators' potential liability. /d. at 64-65. Although certain subgroups of health
care providers have had difficulty obtaining liability insurance for short periods of
time in some states, this difficulty does not reach the seriousness of the situation the
nuclear power industry faced in the mid-1950's. See Law, A Consumer Perspective
on Medical Malpractice, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 305 & n.l (1986) (The
main complaint from the medical profession is that insurance premiums are too
high, not that insurance coverage is nonexistent.) [hereinafter A Consumer
Perspective).
66. Congress has expressly committed itself under Price-Anderson to act beyond the
liability limit set to aid victims of a nuclear accident. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 87
n.3l.
67. Because of a growing resurgence of federalism and the increasing willingness of state
courts to stray from federal constitutional analysis, it cannot be assumed that interpretation of the federal constitution is conclusive when examining similar state constitutional provisions. See Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 705 n.9, 714
n.20, 426 A.2d 929,941 n.9, 946 n.20 (1981). See also Marcotte, Federalism and the
Rise of State Courts, ABA Journal p. 60, 62 (Apr. 1, 1987) (54 cases decided by state
high courts in 25 states have gone beyond the federal constitution's minimum protection). State constitutions are increasingly recognized as a source of independent
scrutiny by the courts, particularly where individual rights are concerned. This
trend to more closely scrutinize state constitutional provisions has led to greater
protection of individual rights. See Smith, supra note 36, at 219 ("[S]tate courts are
exercising their judicial and political perogative of finding state constitutional violations of state statutes in order to vindicate individual rights."). See generally Rees,
State Constitutional Law for Maryland Lawyers: Individual Civil Rights, 7 U. BALT.
L. REV. 299 (1978).
68. See Smith, supra note 36. The author lists five reasons why state courts may be less
restrained in exercising their judicial powers than federal courts:
(1) state courts occupy a different institutional position in the state court
system than does the Supreme Court in the federal system;
(2) state courts routinely engage in fashioning general common law -a
power denied to the federal courts since Erie Railroad v. Tompkins;
(3) state constitutional rights may differ qualitatively from the federal
constitutional rights;
(4) federal courts are obliged to pay due deference to state laws out of
concerns for federalism; and
(5) unlike federal courts, state courts are not courts of limited jurisdiction and are often invested with broad general jurisdictional powers
to adjudicate cases.
/d. at 208.
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fundamental right under the federal or Maryland constitutions. 69 The
right is not guaranteed explicitly or impliedly in either document. 70
Strict scrutiny arguments have failed when classifications based on gender71 and education 72 have been attacked as constitutionally infirm. Arguably, the right infringed here does not reach the constitutional
importance of fairness in gender or education classifications. 73 In the
same vein, it cannot be argued that seriously injured tort victims are a
suspect class, the protection of which mandates strict scrutiny of legislation which discriminates against it. 74

b.

Rational Basis v. Heightened Review

Once strict scrutiny is eliminated as an appropriate standard of review for an equal protection analysis of statutory damages caps, it then
must be determined whether the standard of review should be mere rational basis, under which the statute would inevitably be upheld, or the
intermediate "heightened review", under which the statute could arguably be struck down. On this point state courts have diverged. Some
courts have differentiated between PIRCs that cap total recovery for personal injury and those that cap only noneconomic damage recovery, such
69. But cf supra note 57.
70. The argument can be made, however, that the "full remedy" provision of Article 19
of Maryland's Declaration of Rights conveys the right to recover in full for personal
injuries. See infra nn. 148-57 and accompanying text. See generally Legislative Larceny, supra note 10, at 91-92 (analyzing South Dakota's "remedy for injury" constitutional provision and concluding that the provision prohibits the state legislature
from limiting such common law rights in existence when the South Dakota constitution was adopted). The "full remedy" provision of Maryland's Declaration of
Rights probably mandates procedural fairness only, however, and therefore cannot
be the source of a substantive right in itself. See Attorney General v. Johnson, 282
Md. at 298-301, 385 A.2d at 71-73. In Johnson, the court held that the "Law of the
Land" mentioned in Article 19 is the same due process required by the due process
clause of the 14th amendment. /d. at 298-99, 385 A.2d at 71. The court was analyzing Article 19, in conjunction with the right to a jury trial provision, to determine
if the restriction on the "right of access" provided by Article 19 was significant
enough to violate a medical malpractice claimant's right to a jury trial. /d. at 300,
385 A.2d at 72. The added procedural burden was held to be a reasonable restriction on the claimant's "right of access." /d. at 299, 385 A.2d at 71.
71. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 n.24 (1976).
72. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973). Accord Hornbeck v.
Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).
73. Cf Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 398, 404 N.E.2d 585, 600. The
court reasoned:
While the interest of the severely injured patient in full recovery rather
than partial recovery to the extent of $500,000, is great for the purpose of
selecting the appropriate equal protection test, it is not greater than that of
the children needing but being denied subsistence level support in Dandridge, and is not greater than that of the injured plaintiff in Sidle who
could recover nothing.
/d.

74. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980); Sibley v. Board
of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149, 155, modified on rehearing, 477 So. 2d 1094 (1985).
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as Maryland's PIRC. 75 Apparently these courts would exact more scrutiny over legislation which limits a plaintiff's total recovery of personal
injury damages. 76 In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 77 the Supreme
Court of California reasoned that the intangible nature of noneconomic
damages leads to unpredictably large jury awards, thus forcing liability
insurers to increase insurance premium costs to meet this eventuality. 78
Thus, it is reasoned that a cap on noneconomic damages restores predictability and stability to the liability insurance industry.79 Exacting minimal scrutiny, these courts find ample justification for the legislature's
enaction of a statute which limits a personal injury plaintiff's recovery of
noneconomic damages. 80
Other courts, recognizing that the right to recover noneconomic
damages is an important right, have applied intermediate scrutiny to
strike down their PIRCs. These courts refuse to distinguish between economic and noneconomic damages because noneconomic damages are imbued in the common law and are therefore as valid as economic
damages. 81 Such courts recognize that noneconomic damages allow
75. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 159-60, 695 P.2d 665, 68081, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 383-84, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985); Duren v.
Suburban Community Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 28, 482 N.E.2d 1358, 1362
(1985). Accord Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 111.2d 313, 335, 347
N.E.2d 736, 746 (1976) (Underwood, J., concurring). See generally Medical Malpractice Damages, supra note 33, at 1585.
76. See Fein, 38 Cal.3d at 159-60, 695 P.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384. The court
stated, "No California case ... has ever suggested that the right to recover for such
noneconomic injuries is constitutionally immune from legislative limitation or revision." /d.
77. 38 Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214
(1985).
78. /d. at 163, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386. An American Bar Assocation
report cited in Fein recommended that economic damages not be capped, but it
expressly reserved the Association's opinion on noneconomic damages caps. Id. at
160 n.17, 695 P.2d at 681 n.17, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384 n.17.
79. /d. at 163, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
80. See Fein, 38 Cal.3d at 160, 695 P.2d at 681, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85 ("Although
reasonable persons can certainly disagree as to the wisdom of this provision, we
cannot say that it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest."). See also
Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 115, 156 N.W.2d 657, 669 (1977) (holding that
the classifications are based on public policy and are only unconstitutional if they
rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to meeting the state's objective).
81. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 942,424 A.2d 825, 837 (1980) ("It is only the
award above out-of-pocket loss that is available to compensate in some way for the
pain, suffering, physical impairment or disfigurement that the victim must endure
until death."). See also Fein, 38 Cal.3d at 171, 695 P.2d at 689,211 Cal. Rptr. at
392 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Former Chief Justice Bird, recognizing the fact that
most large noneconomic awards occur where the victim is an infant or young adult,
gauged the California's cap's effect on this group:
Spread out over the expected lifetime of a young person, $250,000 shrinks
to insignificance. Injured infants are prohibited from recovering more
than three or four thousand dollars per year, no matter how excrutiating
their pain, how truncated their lifespans, or how grotesque their disfigurement. Even this small figure will gradually decline as inflation erodes the
real value of the allowable compensation.
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compensation for real, albeit less tangible, injury.8 2
An example of a situation where noneconomic damages are important is where an attorney loses an arm due to some sort of medical negligence. 83 Loss of income would be minimal because the attorney would
still be able to practice law. Once initial medical costs are paid, future
medical expenses would be negligible. The attorney's quality of life,
however, would be greatly diminished. Thus, the fact that a personal
injury plaintiff may receive all of his economic damages in no way implies that he is fully compensated for his injuries. 84
By severely restricting the amount of noneconomic damages a seriously injured plaintiff may recover, noneconomic damage PIRCs will indirectly and adversely affect the plaintiff's utilization of his economic
damage award. 85 Personal injury victims whose employment position
may not warrant a substantial award for loss of income rely heavily on
noneconomic damage recovery for recompense. 86 Additionally, most
personal injury plaintiffs rely on an adequate award of noneconomic
damages to reimburse their counsel for legal services. 87 For purposes of
an equal protection analysis, no persuasive basis exists which justifies differentiating between economic and noneconomic damages. With both
types of damages an important right is affected which warrants intermediate review.
Courts adopting a standard of intermediate scrutiny have placed
greater reliance on the state constitution when determining that the right
to full recovery is an important substantive right, the infringement of
which merits more than a cursory examination. 88 The application of intermediate scrutiny requires that the court discern the actual purpose of
the legislation. 89 The court then must examine whether the means emI d.
82. Carson, 120 N.H. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837.
83. See Moore & Hoff, A More Rational Compensation System for Medical Malpractice,
49 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 117, 123 [hereinafter A More Rational Compensation
System].
84. Jd. See also A Consumer Perspective, supra note 8, at 319. A Consumer Perspective
discussed a proposal in Congress to abolish noneconomic damages and complained,
"[P]eople would be worth only what they can earn, or what they cost in terms of net
medical expense." I d.
85. See Fein, 38 Cal.3d at 160 n. 17, 695 P.2d at 681 n.l7, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384 n.l7
(citing to the Report of Committee on Medical Professional Liability, 102 ABA
Ann. Rep. 786, 849 (1977)).
86. Jd. See also supra nn. 81-84 and accompanying text.
87. See Fein, 38 Cal.3d at 160 n.l7, 695 P.2d at 681 n.l7, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384 n.l7.
88. See Medical Malpractice Damages, supra note 33, at 1603. In Carson, the court
explicitly recognized that the state constitution may, in some instances, afford
greater individual protections than the federal constitution. "[W]e are not confined
to federal constitutional standards and are free to grant individuals more rights than
the Federal Constitution requires." 120 N.H. at 932, 424 A.2d at 831.
89. Critics charge that the utilization of the intermediate scrutiny test by the courts
improperly allows them to sit as superlegislatures because it enables the courts to
analyze the factual bases for the enaction of the legislation. Medical Malpractice
Damages, supra note 33, at 1603-04. As one commentator has noted, however, the

342

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 16

played to effectuate this legitimate purpose bear a "fair and substantial"
relationship to it. 90 A state PIRC usually fails this analysis on at least
one of two bases. Either the purpose or object being furthered is found
invalid 91 or the means employed in furthering a legitimate goal are found
patently unreasonable. 92 In the final analysis, these courts find that legislation which places a grave burden on a small number of catastrophically
injured tort victims so that a benefit may be conferred on tortfeasors and
their insurers must meet an important governmental interest to avoid
being repugnant to the state constitution.
Maryland courts recognize that in some instances an equal protection review warrants greater scrutiny than the traditional rational basis
test would afford. 93 A heightened review standard has been applied or
recognized in Maryland where legislative classifications significantly interfere in the areas of gender, 94 illegitimacy, 95 education, 96 and the right
to work within one's chosen vocation. 97 In Attorney General v. Waldron,98 the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that the equal protection standard of heightened review is applicable "when important
personal rights, not yet held to merit strict scrutiny but deserving of
more protection than a perfunctory review would accord, are affected by
a legislative classification." 99 Application of this analysis to Maryland's

90.
91.
92.

93.
94.

95.
96.

97.

98.
99.

use of an intermediate scrutiny test acquires more validity when applied by a state
court interpreting the state constitution than it does when utilized by a federal
court. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) (no liability insurance crisis
exists); Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 504 (Mont. 1985) (legislative finding was "so
wild in speculation as to be on its face unacceptable").
The Carson court stated the point most succinctly: "It is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the medical care industry solely upon
those persons who are most severely injured and therefore most in need of compensation." Carson v. Mauer, 120 N.H. 925, 942, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (1985). See also
Fein, 38 Cal.3d at 168, 695 P.2d at 687, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
("In order to provide special relief to negligent health care providers and their insurers, MICRA arbitrarily singles out a few injured patients to be stripped of important
and well-established protections against negligently inflicted harm.").
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 641, 458 A.2d 758, 781
(1983). Since the passage of Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment, discrimination
on the basis of sex in Maryland is invalid per se. Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374
A.2d 900 (1977).
See Broadwater v. State, 306 Md. 597, 607, 510 A.2d 583, 587 (1986).
See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 652-53, 458 A.2d at 788 (Without expressly holding that
the right to education is an important personal right, the court appears to have
exacted minimal scrutiny only because the legislation did not significantly interfere
with the right to education.).
Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981). The heightened
review standard is most clearly enunciated in Waldron. In that case the court of
appeals allowed that mere regulation of an applicant's entry into the legal profession
is subject to minimal scrutiny, but the denial of a person's right to practice law when
he is otherwise fully qualified merits heightened review. /d. at 717, 426 A.2d at 948.
/d.
/d. at 713, 426 A.2d at 946.
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PIRC leads to the conclusion that the right of personal injury victims to
recover full compensatory damages is one that mandates more than a
cursory review of the legislation and its purposes. 100 Thus, the intermediate, "heightened review" standard is the appropriate standard of review for Maryland's PIRC enactment.

c.

Heightened Review Applied

Under "heightened review" a legislative enactment that severely infringes on the rights of catastrophically injured tort victims to recover all
compensatory damages from adjudicated tortfeasors must bear a fair and
substantial relationship to the alleviation of any liability insurance crisis. 101 Before an examination of the means utilized in lessening the crisis
can be undertaken, the goal itself must be analyzed to determine if, in
fact, a liability insurance crisis does exist in the state of Maryland. 102
An examination of the liability insurance industry, with particular
reference to the industry's impact on health care providers, leads to the
conclusion that the purpose of the statute is legitimate. Although it may
be debated whether insurance companies actually need to raise premiums
in order to. turn a reasonable profit, 103 there can be no dispute that the
increased premiums themselves have generated a bona fide insurance
problem in Maryland. 104 Health care providers, in particular, are adversely affected by rising insurance costs. 105 The probable loss of qualified medical personnel would have an adverse impact on all citizens of
the state. Legislation to alleviate the problem, therefore, appears to be
appropriate.
Under a heightened review equal protection analysis, the courts
must examine the relationship between the legislation enacted and the
object of the legislature's actions. 106 Consequently, some attention must
100. See Carson, 120 N.H. at 931-32,424 A.2d at 830. See also Hanson v. Williams, 389
N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D. 1986) (applying intermediate scrutiny); Jones v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 312 Pa. Super. 512, 459 A.2d 338 (1983) (same).
101. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
102. See Medical Malpractice Damages, supra note 33, at 1593 ("[M]eans scrutiny analysis requires that convincing evidence of a crisis be submitted to the legislature and
be the basis for the enactment of the statute.").
103. See supra note 8. A report to the Pennsylvania legislature provides some startling
conclusions: Large premium rate increases since 1983 are due to the fact that premium rates were inadequate from 1977-81, the cost of malpractice insurance as a
percentage of total health costs has been declining since 1976, and, finally, "the cost
of malpractice insurance is an insignificant contributor to total health care costs."
The Pennsylvania Experience, XVIX Md. Bar Journal 11 (Jan. 1986).
104. See Maryland Trial Lawyers Assoc. Response to 1985-1986 Liability Insurance Issues, Maryland Trial Lawyers Assoc., at 2 (1986) (submitted to the Maryland General Assembly for consideration before it enacted Maryland's PIRC) [hereinafter
Liability Insurance Issues]; Sia, Tort Reform Clamor Anticipated, Baltimore Evening
Sun, Dec. 28, 1986, at D1, col. 5. But see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 9-10. But cf The Pennsylvania Experience, XVIX Md. Bar Journal
14-15 (Jan. 1986) (premium rates in only a few medical specialties exceeded the
growth of the Medical Care Index between 1976 and 1985).
106. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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be given to the purported objectives of PIRCs. Various supporting arguments are advanced by proponents of PIRC legislation. Perhaps the
most persuasive argument is that state PIRCs provide needed relief to
the insurance industry by reducing the uncertainty and overall cost of
doing business. 107 Theoretically, this reduction in cost is passed on to
those insured and, eventually, to the consumer. 108
Evidence exists that supports the first part of the above argument,
namely, that PIRCs reduce costs to the liability insurance industry. 109
Persuasive evidence also indicates, however, that the reduction in costs is
minimal and, in any case, is not passed on to the consumer by the liability insurer. 1 10 Although a recent survey of medical malpractice claims in
several states indicates that the reduction in severity of damages attributable to PIRCs is approximately twenty-two percent, 111 the enactment of
PIRCs and other restrictive tort legislation has not substantially affected
liability insurance rates in those states. 112 Locally, less than one month
after Maryland's PIRC was enacted, Maryland's largest medical insurance underwriter increased its rates by fifty percent. 113 The insurance
industry estimates that the PIRCs effect on insurance premium rates in
Maryland will not be felt for at least three years. 114
Assuming for the moment that Maryland's PIRC on noneconomic
107. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence,
49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (No. 2) 58, 76-77 ("Because large awards account for
a disproportionate fraction of total dollars, . . . caps that severely reduce the few
large dollar awards can have a significant impact on the average and on the total
payout.") [hereinafter Danzon]. This argument is asserted most vigorously when
the PIRC limits only noneconomic damages: "The open-ended nature of such damages makes them a particular problem from the standpoint of achieving predictability. Unlike economic damages, which can be predicted within a given range, noneconomic damages are entirely subjective and unpredictable." Insurance Profitability- The Facts, Insurance Services Offices, ch. 4, at 7 (1986).
108. But see Sia, Tort Reform Clamor Anticipated, at D2, col. 4 (Less than one month
after the cap's enactment, the largest medical malpractice insurer requested and
received a fifty percent increase in premium rates.). The chief executive officer of
Maryland Mutual has stated that the enactment of its recommendations will reduce
the expected increase by only thirty percent, Liability Insurance Issues, supra note
104, at 6.
109. See supra note 107.
110. "Where the total of all settlements and awards amounts to about one-third of the
premiums paid, a fact which is utilized as a major argument against the malpractice
suit, an occasional reduced award can have little impact [upon the cost of malpractice insurance]." Redlich, supra note 10, at 322. See also The Pennsylvania Experience, supra note 103, at 17 (this type of tort reform is merely a cost shifting device).
A report from the Insurance Information Institute provided that industry profits for
1986 stood at $11 billion, an increase of six-hundred percent over 1985. McNatt,
New Solutions Needed for Maryland's Insurance 'Crisis', Baltimore Evening Sun,
Jan. 13, 1987, at AS, col. 1.
111. See Danzon, supra note 107, at 76-77.
112. See Angoff & Hunter, How Far Have We Come in Solving the 'Liability Crisis'?,
Baltimore Evening Sun, Feb. 3, 1987, A 10, col. 3.
113. /d.
114. Sia, Tort Reform Clamor Anticipated, Baltimore Evening Sun, Dec. 28, 1986 at D2,
col. 4.
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damages will result in savings for either liability insurers, their insured,
or both, mere economic savings alone cannot justify the implementation
of legislation that affects important personal rights, especially in the context of intermediate scrutiny . 115 Because even the most invidious legislation can be justified by proponents on economic grounds, PIRC
supporters will need to proffer other arguments to support the legislation's constitutionality if it is to withstand intermediate review. 116
Some proponents of state PIRCs have argued that their enactment
serves to eliminate frivolous lawsuits. 117 This theory is illogical, however, because PIRCs have an adverse effect only on the victorious plaintiff's recovery of his damages in full. 118 Moreover, sufficient safeguards
- including the screening of cases by mandatory arbitration 119 and the
availability of a malicious prosecution remedy- currently exist to combat frivolous lawsuits. The actual effect of PIRCs is less laudable. The
uncertainty surrounding the application of PIRCs will be used as leverage by defendants against severely injured plaintiffs in forcing settlement
for much less than full recovery for their injuries. 120
Proponents further argue that the recovery limitation remedies a
"lottery-like atmosphere" in the courtroom where sympathetic juries
115. See Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 724, 426 A.2d 929, 951 (1981).
"Undeniably, [the legislation in question] can save the State a bit of money, but we
will not engage in tautological equal protection analysis by deducing purpose from
result." Id.
It appears, however, that PIRCs enacted in other states do not provide significant long term relief to tortfeasors. See Angoff and Hunter, How Far Have We
Come in Solving the 'Liability Crisis'?, Baltimore Evening Sun, Jan. 25, 1987, A 11,
col. 1. Professor Redlich has offered one possible reason why PIRCs do not significantly affect insurance rates:
As a cost-saving device, this type of legislation is illusory. If one desired,
for example, to minimize height as a factor in college basketball, barring
8'6" players would obviously change nothing. Most of the states establishing ceilings acted in this manner. Those states in which awards were traditionally large did not enact this particular remedy with the exception of
Illinois, whose attempt was invalidated before its effective date.
Assuming a limit that was in fact lower than awards made by juries in
a particular jurisdiction, one would nevertheless have to conclude, upon
even cursory analysis, that there would be little if any impact upon the
cost of malpractice insurance. Where the total of all settlements and
awards amounts to about one-third of the premiums paid, a fact which is
utilized as a major argument against the malpractice suit, an occasional
reduced award can have little impact.
Redlich, supra note 10, at 322.
116. Redlich, supra note 10, at 322.
117. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 127 (N.D. 1978) (preamble to the statute in
question listed its purposes, including the elimination of the expense involved in
nonmeritorious claims).
118. Redlich, supra note 10, at 324 ("[T]hey [PIRCs] are often aimed at penalizing those
with good cases.").
119. See Mo. CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 3-2A-01 to -04 (1984) (statutes establishing Maryland's Health Claim Arbitration Office).
120. See Practice Tips- The Noneconomic Damages Cap, XIX Maryland Bar Journal
14, 15 (July 1986).
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award grossly excessive compensation to personal injury plaintiffs for
their injuries. 121 Aside from underestimating the capability of the juries
to reach well-reasoned conclusions as to the proper measure of damages,
this argument ignores established and increasingly utilized safeguards
such as remitittur and judgments notwithstanding the verdict in cases
where the verdict and/or award are inconsistent with the evidence. 122
This argument also ignores the fact that a medical arbitration panel of
three persons, one of whom is a health care provider, initially determines
the claim's validity. 123 Only twenty percent of the arbitration panel's
decisions are appealed to the circuit court for a possible jury trial. 124
Finally, the argument is made that PIRCs are necessary to preserve
the quality and adequacy of medical care. 125 This circuitous reasoning
does not survive careful analysis. Although the quality of medical care
may be correlated to the cost to health providers in providing that care,
the constitutional validity of state PIRCs cannot be evaluated from a
strictly economic standpoint. 126 Moreover, it is patently illogical to
maintain that PIRCs preserve the quality of medical care by limiting the
liability of physicians guilty of medical malpractice. 127 It is inconceiv121. See A More Rational Compensation System, supra note 83, at 117 ("windfall recoveries for the few plaintiffs who win the lottery of litigation"); Smith, supra note 36,
at 195-96 (analogizing the "medical malpractice litigation rush" and "million dollar
jury verdicts" to last century's gold rush).
122. See Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 482 N.E.2d 1358
(1985). After holding that the Ohio PIRC was unconstitutional, the court entered
remittitur reducing the plaintiff's award from $1,000,000 to $500,000. /d. at 34;
482 N.E.2d at 1368. The ABA House of Representatives at the ABA mid-year
meeting proposed that ceilings on noneconomic damages should not be enacted.
"Instead, trial and appellate courts should make greater use of their power of remittitur or additur for verdicts that are excessive or inadequate compared to community expectations." ABA Ok's Tort Reform Plan, ABA JoURNAL, 18, (Apr. I,
1987). See also Redlich, supra note 10, at 323. Florida's comprehensive medical
malpractice legislation includes a provision allowing the trial court to examine a
jury's award and determine whether it is inadequate or excessive. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.49 (West 1982). The legislature cautions that the statute does not give the
courts carte blanche to interfere with reasonable jury awards: "The Legislature recognizes that the reasonable actions of a jury are a fundamental precept of American
jurisprudence and that such actions should be disturbed or modified with caution
and discretion. § 768.49(6). But see § 768.80 (Florida's recently enacted $450,000
limitation on noneconomic damages).
123. Liability Insurance Issues, supra note 104, at 7.
124. /d. Most decisions appealed from the arbitration panel consist of large monetary
awards to the personal injury plaintiff; the health care provider's insurer appeals.
/d.
125. See generally Classen, Liability Crisis Easing for Doctors?, Daily Record, Jan. 2,
1987, at 10, col. I.
126. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
127. A much simpler way of preserving quality medical care is for the medical profession
to toughen an almost nonexistent disciplinary policy against malpracticing physicians. See Miller, Report Ranks Maryland Low in Disciplining Doctors, Baltimore
Evening Sun, Dec. 28, 1986, at AI, col. 2 (In Maryland, no medical licenses were
revoked in 1985. Nationally, 100,000 Americans are injured or die each year as a
result of medical negligence.).
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able that the enactment of a state PIRC will induce greater vigilance
among the medical profession; quite the opposite is more likely.
This brief survey of the purported objectives of PIRC legislation
reveals that Maryland's legislation is unlikely to achieve its objectives for
numerous reasons: (1) the noneconomic damage recovery limitation affects only the most seriously injured plaintiffs; (2) the limitation's potential economic benefits are not readily ascertainable; (3) many other less
drastic and potentially more effective remedies are available; and (4) seriously injured tort victims are not even remotely the cause of any liability
insurance crisis which may exist. Because the recovery limitation bears
no "fair and substantial" relationship to an important governmental objective, the cap clearly discriminates between personal injury victims, depriving the most seriously injured victims of a potentially large portion of
their compensatory damages. Therefore, under a heightened review
analysis, the noneconomic damages limitation violates the equal protection principles embodied in Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. 128
C.

Due Process Challenges

By denying a personal mJury plaintiff his right to recover
noneconomic damages above the $350,000 limitation, Maryland's
128. Some courts have attacked the constitutionality of PIRC's on the ground that
PIRC's are "special legislation". This attack is similar to the equal protection attack in that special legislation is legislation that favors one group of persons over a
similarly situated group.
Illinois invalidated its PIRC on the sole basis that the legislation granted a
special privilege to malpracticing health care providers and their insurers to the
exclusion of other tortfeasors. See Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 329-30, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
Cf Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136-37 (N.D. 1978) (where court did not
rule on appellee's special law challenge, finding that the limitation was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds).
Maryland's constitution prohibits the legislature from enacting special laws
that favor one group of persons over a similarly situated group. Mo. CONST. art.
III, § 33. The provision reads in part: "And the General Assembly shall pass no
special law, for any case, for which provision has been made, by an existing General
Law." /d. It may be that in enacting section 11-108, the General Assembly avoided
creating an issue on this constitutional provision because section 11-108 applies in
all cases where personal injury has occurred, not just medical malpractice cases.
Mo. CTs. & Jun. PRoc. CODE ANN.§ ll-108(b). On the other hand, one commentator has argued that such legislation still may be subject to attack as special legislation on the ground that an arbitrary damage limitation treats members of a
legislatively created class - personal injury victims - differently. See Legislative
Larceny, supra note 10, at 97 (The level set for state damage limitations is
unarguably discriminatory; because analysis under a constitutional special law provision clearly mirrors an equal protection analysis, the limitations should be examined within an equal protection framework.). See also Smith, supra note 36, at
216.
The special legislation argument is likely to fail in Maryland. Even if the legislation were found to provide a special benefit or burden to the legislatively created
class of personal injury victims, it would only be struck down if there were already
general laws designed to remedy the problem. Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor, 290
Md. 553, 567, 431 A.2d 663, 671 (1981). No such general laws exist.
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noneconomic damages cap is also subject to a substantive due process
attack under Article 24 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights and the
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Under traditional
substantive due process analysis, a statute is examined in an extremely
deferential light and will be struck down only if it is arbitrary and unreasonable.129 However, some state courts have held that when a common
law right to recover damages for personal injury is abrogated, due process is violated unless a corresponding substitute or quid pro quo is provided.130 With the demise of federal substantive due process, the quid
pro quo doctrine had largely fallen into disuse, I3I but the doctrine was
revived in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group. 132 In
Duke Power, the Supreme Court upheld a legislatively created $560 million dollar limitation on liability for nuclear accidents resulting from the
operation of federally licensed privately run nuclear power plants. 133
The Court held that the statute was not irrational or arbitrary. 134 In
determining the reasonableness of the statute, the Court did not decide
whether a quid pro quo is constitutionally required when a common law
right is legislatively abrogated. 135 The Court did hold, however, that a
quid pro quo was provided, in large part due to explicit congressional
assurances regarding the availability of the fund, as well as a congressional commitment to take further action to protect the public in the
remote event of a major nuclear accident. 136
As discussed in the section on equal protection, a few state courts
have analogized to the decision in Duke Power to justify upholding their
respective state PIRCs as constitutional. 137 These courts fail to recog129. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 8384 (1978); Ferguson v. Garmon, 643 F. Supp. 335, 342 (D. Kan. 1986) (In upholding Kansas' collateral source rule, the court acknowledged that federal substantive
due process analysis is "quite deferential.").
130. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 943, 424 A.2d 825, 837-38 (1980); Simon v. St.
Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903, 910 (1976). Cf
Baptist Hosp. of S.E. Texas v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(The constitutionality of a statute is strengthened where a quid pro quo is provided.).
131. Medical Malpractice Damages, supra note 33, at 1589-90.
132. 438 u.s. 59 (1978).
133. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93. The Price-Anderson Act is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210 (1970 ed. and Supp. V).
134. /d. at 84-85. The Court acknowledged that dollar limitations in the context examined in Duke Power are almost always arbitrary, but this type of arbitrariness
does not necessarily constitutionally flaw the legislation under examination. !d. at
86.
135. /d. at 88.
136. /d. at 90-92. The Court also noted that under the Act victims are afforded immediate payments prior to the determination of the extent of their injuries, private nuclear power plant operators are required to waive their defenses, and plaintiffs are
not required to show fault. The Court concluded, therefore, that a quid pro quo was
provided. !d.
137. See Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585; Sibley v. Board of
Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La.), remanded on rehearing, 477 So. 2d 1094 (1985).
On rehearing, the Supreme Court of Louisana articulated a constitutional standard
for the trial court to utilize which appears to be the equivalent of an intermediate
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nize the major differences between the statute examined in Duke Power
and a state PIRC. The policy behind the statute examined in Duke
Power is readily distinguishable from that motivating state PIRC's. 138 In
addition to disregarding the plain differences in the circumstances which
existed in Duke Power, state courts relying on Duke Power to uphold the
constitutionality of their PIRCs under a substantive due process analysis
invariably ignore any independent examination under their state
constitutions. 139
State courts have split on the issue of whether a quid pro quo must
be given when the common law right to full recovery for personal injury
in tort is limited by the legislature. 140 A few state courts have held that a
societal quid pro quo is established by the decrease in liability insurance
costs and by the corresponding consumer cost reductions which presumably result from the implementation of a state PIRC. 141 This argument
is bolstered in states which have enacted comprehensive legislation in
this area, especially where the legislation provides for a patients' compensation fund designed to guarantee at least some monetary recovery for
personal injury victims. 142 The societal quid pro quo argument, however,
has been roundly rejected by several courts. 143 Consumer medical cost
reductions are not markedly evident in states with PIRCs. 144 Even if
they were, this societal quid pro quo is hollow solace to seriously injured
tort victims. 145 In states without any legislative guarantee of a minimum

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

143.
144.
145.

scrutiny analysis. 477 So. 2d at 1109. After remand to the trial court, the state now
has the burden to show that there is good reason for the statutory classification. /d.
See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
See Note, Constitutionality of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Re-evaluated,
19 VAL. U.L. REV. 493, 509-10 n.l33 (1985) (urging the Indiana court to adopt the
means scrutiny standard when and if it reexamines that state's PIRC).
See supra notes 130 and 137 and accompanying text.
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 135, 160-61 n.18, 695 P.2d 665,68182 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 384-85 n.18, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985);
Johnson, 273 Ind. at 396, 404 N.E.2d at 599.
See Johnson, 273 Ind. at 399, 404 N.E.2d at 601. ("There is good reason to believe
that the interests of patients in ultimately transforming valid claims into money is
furthered by the availability to the health care industry of some risk spreading
mechanism at reasonable cost.").
See Wright v. Central Du Page Hasp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313, 328, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742
(1976) (rejecting the societal quid pro quo doctrine); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med.
Center, 355 N.E.2d 903, 910 (1976) (same, relying on Wright).
The Pennsylvania Experience, Vol. XVIX The Maryland Bar Journal 11, 17 (Jan.
1986). See also A Consumer Perspective, supra note 65, at 315 ("Reform efforts that
see reduced premiums as the 'bottom line' will almost inevitably injure patients.").
In Carson v. Maurer, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire dismissed the defendant's societal quid pro quo argument quoting an earlier case:
In our opinion, abolition of the rights of a class of persons ... to recover
damages for their injuries in full would contravene the plain language of
article 14, part I of the New Hampshire constitution, in the absence of
provision of a satisfactory substitute, and certainly recovery of only a limited portion of such damages cannot be equivalent to recovery of the damages in full. Society cannot escape its responsibility to provide justice by
simply eliminating the rights of its citizens.
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 943, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (1980) (emphasis in origi-
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tort recovery for personal injury victims, the societal quid pro quo argument is simply eviscerated.
A Maryland court examining section 11-108 within a substantive
due process framework should weigh heavily the nonexistence of a quid
pro quo. Without the availability of a quid pro quo, the statute should be
struck down under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as
an unreasonable denial of due process. 146 The equal protection arguments already discussed also serve to supplement a due process attack.
As once observed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, "there is no
practical distinction between the grounds on which the two contentions
[of equal protection and due process] are argued, and determination of
one will resolve the other."147

D.

Right of Access to the Courts and 'Pull Remedy" Provisions
Article 19 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights provides:
That every man, for any injury done to him, in his person or
property, ought to have remedy by the course of the law of the
land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale,
fully without denial, and speedily without delay, according to
the law of the land. 14s

Similar provisions in other state constitutions have been relied upon in
attacking state PIRCs as unconstitutional infringements of a person's
right to "remedy ... fully without denial." 149 In Smith v. Department of

146.

147.
148.

149.

nal) (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 215, 304 A.2d 881, 888 (1973)
(Duncan and Grimes, J.J., dissenting)).
Prior to the enactment of section 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article of the Maryland Code, the Maryland legislature established a medical liability insurance company. See MD. ANN. CoDE art. 48A, §§ 548-56 (1986). Membership is not required to receive the benefit of the noneconomic damages cap. No state
assurances have been given that personal injury victims will receive benefits or aid to
compensate them for the enactment of the damage limitation. To the contrary,
more comprehensive legislation has been enacted which will further erode the ability of personal injury plaintiffs to sue in tort. See supra note 17-18.
See Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 422, 474 A.2d 191, 206
(1984) (quoting Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. State, 286 Md. 611, 618,409 A.2d 250,
254 (1980)).
Md. Decl. of Rights, Art. 19 (adopted by convention in 1867). The date of a constitutional provision's enactment is important because common law causes of action in
existence at the time are deemed to be acknowledged and protected under this provision. Accord Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 704, 501 A.2d 27, 34-35 (1985) (The
shortening of a statute of limitations based on the discovery rule is not violative of
Article 19 because the discovery rule was not adopted by Maryland until half a
century after the adoption of Article 19.)
See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Pfost v. State, 713
P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985) (right to full redress for injury is a fundamental right under a
constitutional provision similar to Article 19). But see Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) (Plaintiff's argument that the statute
violated the "full remedy" clause was rejected, but the issue of the statute's constitutionality on equal protection grounds was remanded to the trial court which held
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Insurance, 150 the Supreme Court of Florida struck down Florida's
$450,000 noneconomic damages cap as an unconstitutional infringement
on the right of access to the courts for redress of injury. 151 The court
held that such a statute could survive constitutional examination only if
an adequate alternative remedy was provided or where an "over-powering public necessity" compelled such measures and no alternative
method for meeting that necessity exists. 152 Two conceivable attacks
may be raised based on Article 19. Either the noneconomic damages
limitation so substantially interferes with Article 19 as to be deemed a
constitutional infringement, 153 or the constitutional provision presents
persuasive evidence that the right to recover damages for personal injury
is an important, if not fundamental, right for purposes of an equal protection analysis. 154
The outcome of an analysis under Article 19 and its full remedy
provision is not clear. Although most decisions interpreting the provision in Maryland have examined it in a procedural due process context,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Hill v. Fitzgerald, 155 implicitly recognized that the provision grants a fundamental right, significant interference of which merits strict scrutiny review. 156 Notwithstanding,
jurisdictions examining similar provisions in their state constitutions
have rejected the argument that such a provision absolutely bars the legislature from limiting or abolishing common law causes of action or
remedies. 157
IV.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE LIABILITY
INSURANCE PROBLEM
The first step a legislature must take in correcting the liability insur-

150.
151.

152.
153.
154.

155.
156.
157.

the statute to be unconstitutional.). See generally Legislative Larceny, supra note 10,
at 84-92.
507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
The $450,000 noneconomic damages cap was struck down by 7-2 decision. The
majority held, "A plaintiff who receives a jury verdict for, e.g., $1,000,000 has not
received a constitutional redress of injuries if the legislature statutorily, and arbitrarily, caps the recovery at $450,000." Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1088.
/d.
See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Legislative Larceny,
supra note 10, at 90-91.
Pfost, 713 P.2d at 503.
We have shown above that the state constitution provides a speedy judicial
remedy for every injury of person, property or character, and that such
speedy remedy includes a full legal redress as a fundamental interest.
Since a fundamental interest is involved, [the statute] must be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny in determining whether it complies with our state
equal protection provisions and other provisions of our State Constitution.
/d.
304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985).
/d. at 701, 501 A.2d at 33.
See Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 394, 404 N.E.2d 585, 598 (1980);
Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149, 157, modified on rehearing, 477 So.
2d 1094 (1985).
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ance problem is to engage in a real and exhaustive analysis of the actual
causes and severity of the problem. An arbitrary PIRC enacted as a result of pressures from the insurance and medical lobbies without any substantial factual basis for the legislative action would be clearly
unwarranted. 158 Inasmuch as credible evidence has been presented by
both sides concerning the existence of a bona fide insurance crisis, 159 the
question merits detached and careful inquiry.
Although a major cause of the problem may be the bringing of
harassing and frivolous law suits by some plaintiff's attorneys, many less
drastic, well-reasoned solutions exist. In medical malpractice actions,
the legislature could increase the plaintiff's burden of proving liability
from a preponderance of the evidence standard to one requiring clear and
convincing evidence. 160 Sanctions could be stiffened against attorneys
who bring patently frivolous law suits. 161 In states which have not abolished ad damnum clauses, the plaintiff and/or his attorney could be
charged a surcharge or penalty on any gap between damages alleged and
damages proven. 162
Remittitur and close appellate court review are safeguards already
in existence that may be utilized more aggressively to reduce jury awards
that are not consistent with the evidence presented. 163 However, if the
circumstances warrant a large award of monetary damages for economic
and noneconomic injury, the jury's determination should not be disturbed by the trial or appellate court.
Contrary to the arguments raised by the medical and insurance professions, the legal system is not the sole cause of any perceived crisis. 164
158. In fact, the evidence available shows that there is no litigation explosion and that
the average plaintiff's award is not increasing at an uncontrollable rate. See Liability Insurance Issues, supra note 104, at 4-5 (The number of medical malpractice suits
filed from 1975 to 1983 has increased at an annual rate of 3.4 percent; the average
malpractice award increased by 3.9 percent per annum from 1981 through 1984
while the mid-point actually decreased at a rate of 3.5 percent.). Very little statistical information is available concerning the effect noneconomic damages have as a
percentage of total awards and settlements. Redlich, supra note 10, at 322-23.
159. See supra, notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
160. Redlich, supra note 10, at 325-332. The main problem with this idea is the real
possibility that a jury will not perceive the quantitative difference in changing the
burden of proof standard from a preponderence of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 329.
161. Id. at 332-34.
162. Professor Redlich proposes stiff sanctions for attorneys who pursue frivolous cases
beyond a preliminary discovery period. Redlich, supra note 10, at 333-34. To implement this sanction scheme, the defendant's records should be available to the
plaintiff's attorney during the preliminary discovery period. Id. This would enable
the attorney to make an informed decision concerning the continuation of legal proceedings against the defendant. Id.
163. See supra note 122. "According to one study, done by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice, half of the initial jury awards surveyed were reduced after
the trial." The Manufactured Crisis, Consumer Reports, Aug. 1986, at 545.
164. Evidence does exist, however, that supports the fact that "bad claims" represent
about 40 percent of a liability insurer's loss adjustment expenses. Th? Pennsylvania
Experience, supra note 103, at 17.
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The few in-depth studies of the problem indicate that the medical and
insurance professions have also significantly contributed to the liability
insurance problem. 165 Measures should be taken within the medical profession to toughen disciplinary procedures and penalties against malpracticing health care providers. 166 Additionally, legislation needs to be
implemented to correct problems of information disclosure and financial
misdealings within a severely underregulated insurance industry. 167
A workable solution to the liability insurance crisis will require the
cooperation of all three professions involved. True solutions can only be
effected after a determination of the actual causes of the problem. An
arbitrary cap on damage awards is too simplistic and harsh a solution to
the crisis. Great care should be taken to limit or avoid placing the burden of correcting a complex problem on the innocent consumer. 168
V.

CONCLUSION

Section 11-108 of Maryland's Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code
should be struck down by the courts as unconstitutional. The statute
violates state constitutional guarantees of equal protection and state and
federal constitutional protections of one's right to a jury trial. It also
may violate state constitutional guarantees of substantive due process.
Personal injury victims should not be penalized for the negligence, recklessness, and incompetence of the medical profession, nor should insurance companies be permitted to bolster their profits to the detriment of
personal injury victims. The poorly reasoned enactment of Maryland's
PIRC should be nullified, if not by the legislature itself, then by the state
judiciary.

James R. Andersen

165.
166.

167.

168.

However, according to Jury Verdict Research, an Ohio firm, the median initial
medical malpractice award increased at a rate lower than inflation between 1975
and 1984. The Manufactured Crisis, Consumer Reports, Aug. 1986, at 546. In seventeen states studied by the National Center for State Courts, the average number of
tort claims filed increased by 9 percent between 1978 and 1984; the population in
those states increased by 8 percent during the same period. /d.
See generally Redlich, supra note 10.
Miller, Report Ranks Maryland Low in Disciplining Doctors, Baltimore Evening
Sun, Dec. 28, 1986 at A1, col. 2; Nader, Maybe Malpractice is One Cause of Malpractice Suits, Sept. 11, 1985 (reprinted in Liability Insurance Issues, supra note
104).
"[T]here exists no comprehensive database containing the malpractice experience of
individual health care providers. Incomplete information makes sound underwriting a virtual impossibility." The Pennsylvania Experience, supra note 103, at 15.
See also Redlich, supra note 10, at 336-37.
See generally, A Consumer Perspective, supra note 65.

